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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of not guilty in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, to an information charging him with Unlawful
Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance (R.2-3).

On

June 2, 1975 appellant entered a plea of guilty to the lesser and
included offense in the information of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, which under Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(2)(b)(i)
(as amended 1972), carries a penalty of not more than $299 or imprisoc.
ment in the county jail for not more than six months. (R.9)

On June 9, 1975, the Court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed the appellant on probation for one year.

(R.lO)

On March 4, 1976, Judge Bryant H. Croft signed an order
requiring the defendant to appear and show cause why his probation
should not be revoked.

(R. 11)

This ordercame almost nine months

after the order placing appellant on probation.

On March 17, 1976, counsel for appellant filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (R.29) and on March 30, 1976 the
Court heard arguments on the motion (R.30).

Both sides submitted

memoranda and the Court, by memorandum decision of April 19, 1976.
denied appellant's motion.

It is this decision from which appellant

pursues this appeal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHERE THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR EXTENDING A
PROBATIONARY PERIOD BEYOND THE MAXIMUM LIMITS FOR AN
OFFENSE THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION FOR ONLY THE
PERIOD 6F THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE AND CANNOT THEREAFTER
TERMINATE THE PROBATION.
Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17, (1953) authorizes Utah courts
to stay imposition or execution of a criminal sentence but does not
specify the length of time for which a commitment may be stayed and the
person placed on probation.

Other than short stays for specified

purposes, the only stays contemplated are those under that statute, 1
·•hich provides:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime or offense,
if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court
having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the execution
of sentence and may place the defendant on probation for such
period of time as the court shall determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation
period, and may revoke or modify any condition of probation.
While on probation, the defendant may be required to pay, in
one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time being placed
on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation
to the aggrieved party or parties for the actual damages or
losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has
pleaded guilty or for which conviction was had; and may be
required to provide for the support of his wife or others
for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears
to the court from the report of the probation agent in charge
of the defendant, or otherwise, that the defendant has
complied with the conditions of such probation, the court
may if it be compatible with the public interest eithe~
upon motion of the district attorney or of its own mot1on
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or
conviction of the defendant, and dismiss the action and
discharge the defendant."

:lcPhie
v. byTurner,
10 Library.
UtahFunding
2d for237,
(1960).
Sponsored
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The Utah Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issue
of whether acourt may impose probation for a period longer than the
maximum sentence allowed.

There is ample authority from other

jurisdictions, however, in support of Defendant's contention that
where the statute authorizing probation fails to specify the
maximum period of probation to which a person may be subjected, the
maximum period allowed is the maxioum sentence of imprisonment which
could have been imposed.

The general rule is stated in 21 Am. Jur.

2d Criminal Law §555:
of imposition of sentence is

The most recent pronouncement on the issue comes from the
New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Lard, 86 N.M. 71, 519 P.2d
307 (1974).

In Lard the defendant attacked the propriety of the

enhanced sentence directed by the lower court.

Under New Mexico

law a sentence may be enhanced according to a specific statute provic
for such due to defendant's prior record.

Defendant contended that

the enhancement provision was improperly applied.

The court decided

against the defendant on this issue but stated in dicta the general
rule that .

If

''The ~otal length of a deferred or suspended sentence, or .
the t~me served on parole, cannot exceed the maximum author1z
sentence for the crime involved." (emphasis added) 519 P.2Ci
The Idaho Supreme Court had considered the identical questior
presented there in Ex Parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953)
In that case, the court was dealing with a statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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similar to Utah Code Annotated, §77-35-17.

The Idaho statute

provided:
"Whenever any person shall have been convicted or enter a
plea of guilty in any District Court of this State of Idaho,
of or to any crime against the Laws of the State, except
those of treason or murder, the court may in its discretion,
commute the sentence, confine the defendants in the county
jail, or if the defendant is of proper age in the State
Industrial School, suspend the execution of the judgment, or
withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may
prescribe and may put the defendant on probation in charge of
some proper person selected and designated by this court for
;:hat purpose and make such orders related thereto as the court
in its sound discretion deems necessary and expedient."
(emphasis added) Idaho Code §19-2601,
(as amended 1949).
~otwithstanding

statutory language allowing the court to order

probation for "such time as it may prescribe"

(identical to Utah's

statute), the Idaho Supreme Court stated at 799:
of probation could have been for the maximum
etitioner mi ht have been im risoned
ut not or a ~reater per~o .
(emphas~s added) 253 P.2d at 800.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Ex Parte Medley
in its holding in State v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969).
In Sandoval appellant argued that one condition of probation

constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

In dismissing the

Appellant's contention the court noted prior holdings concerning
probation and stated:
"The period of probation may last as long a7 th7 maxim~
period for which defendant might have been ~mpr~soned.
452 P.2d at 358.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Supreme Court of Kansas had also ruled that a judge may
parole persons as he sees fit but he has no power to extend the
conditions of the parole beyond the term of the sentence which
could have been imposed.

The Court held In re Carroll, 91 Kan.

395, 137 P.975 (1914) that where petitioners had been sentenced
to six months in jail (the maximum penalty) and placed on parole
by the sentencing judge for two years, the judge was not authorized
to extend the term of parole beyond a maximum sentence.

In language

oft-quoted since this l9l4 decision, the court stated:

"But is there no limit to the period of parole? Can it have
been the purpose of the legislature that a police judge,
having imposed a sentence of imprisonment for ten days,
can issue a parole upon the condition that the paroled person
shall be under surveillance for ten years, or even longer anc
subject to be committed at any time for a violation of parole
It is true the statute provides that the parole shall be
granted upon such conditions as the police judge may see fit
to impose, but the view of the court is that it was not the
legislative intent that the parole period might be
indefinitely extended . . . Although the statute . . . does
not expressly declare a limit, one is doubtless contemplated
and, since provision is made for imprisonment, that should
be regarded as the limit of time for the termination of a
parole and the absolute discharge of the paroled person. It
is argued that a parole is a matter of grace and discretion
but could it be regarded as a gracious act to hold over the
head of a convicted person the unexecuted sentence for a lifet
with the uncertainty that he might be recommitted to prison
without notice at any time when the police judge chose to
order it?
137 P. at 977.
In a situation similar to the case at bar, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled in 1925 that a judgment could be suspended only
for the length of time of the maximum sentence.

In Ex Parte Eaton,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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29 0. Cr. 275, 233 P. 781 (1925) the Court was dealing with a statute
similar to the Utah statute presently in issue.

The Oklahoma statute

did not specify a period for which a person's sentence could be
suspended in lieu of probation or parole.

The statute stated only

that at any time during "pendency of the judgment" the stay could be
revoked.

The Court held that the judgment was only pending for

the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced because:
"It was certainly not the

intention of the lawmakers to hold the

sentence over the head of a person paroled so long as he should
live .

. "233 P. at 782.
Although some states by statute allow periods longer than the

term of possible imprisonment, those states have some maximum stated
and do not tolerate revocation after the maximum;e.g. Coleman v. Davis

106 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1958).

Further, where the judge fails to specify

:he period in those jurisdictions, it has been generally held to be for
the maximum period for which the person could be sentenced.
supra; People ex rel.

Coleman,

Berman v. Marsden, 162 N.Y.S. 993 (1957).

For

example, in Commonwealth v. Duff, 192 A. 2d 258 (Pa. 1963), the court
stated:
'!herefore, when the court suspends the imposition of
sentence without fixing terms of probation, it may, for
proper reasons impose a prison sentence . . . if it does
so within the maximum term which could have
im osed
t
ense.
-62 .
. . . [W]e have considered such a suspension as
containing an i~olied probation for the maximum period
for which defenaant could have been sentenced . . ''
(emphasis added) 192 A.2d at 261.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Similar holdings emerge from California.

In People v. Blake::.,

170 Ca. 2d 596,339 P.2d 202 (1959) the District Court of Appeals,
First District, Division l held that a revocation occurring eight
months after probation was granted was invalid because it occurred
after the maximum probationary period allowable.

In Blakeman the

defendant could have been sentenced to a maximum of six months.
The Court there stated:
"Here, no period of ?robation was specified in the order
granting it. Accordingly, the six months maximum period
of punishment (Pen. Code, Section 243) became the period
of probation. In re Herron, 217 Cal. 400, 405, 19 P.2d 4;
In re Goetz, 46 Cal. App. 2d 848, 851, 117 P.2d 47;
Peo~le v. Sheeley, 159 Cal. App. 2d 578, 581, 324 P.2d 65.
Pla~ntiff argues that when the court imposed a sentence of or.i
year (excessive by six months) and immediately suspended it.
the court indicated an intent to give probation for one
year. We are not persuaded, particularly in view of the
established principle that when the probationary period is no:
specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible perioc
of imprisonment."
339 P.2d at 204.
The Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah has considered the question three times previously in
Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

In Juliette Harris v. Dewev FC

Case No. 187877, (1969) the petitioner alleged that

the court lost

jurisdiction over her after six months, the maximum sentence she cou::
have been given for the offense committed.

The case file contains

no findings of fact or conclusions of law, however the record of
actions indicates that the Writ was granted by Judge
July 18, 1969.

~.C.

Faux on

(See appendix A).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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l
In a second case, Charles Franklin Himes v. Delmar Larson,
Civil No. 188585 (1969), petitioner alleged that the court that
had revoked his probation was without jurisdiction to do so.

Judge

Gordon R. Hall granted the Writ on September 9, 1969, signing conclusions
of law stating that at the time of revocation of petitioner's
?robation, the court lacked jurisdiction over him.

(See appendix B).

In the third case, Elizabeth Ann Smith v. Salt Lake City Court,
Civil No. 227320 (1975), the City Court had revoked petitioner's
?robation.

Judge Stewart M. Hansen, Sr. granted the Writ and made

conclusions of law stating that the maximum length of probation
could not exceed the maximum period of incarceration allowable for the
offense.

(See appendix C).
Judge Bryant H. Croft's memorandum opinion in the instant

~atter

issue.

places him in the minority among Third District judges on this
Although this wTiter has nothing but the highest respect

for Judge Croft, his decision overlooks the case law and more pursuasive
arguments on the subject presented in this brief and accepted by his
colleagues.

Judge Croft bases his denial of appellant's decision on

t'•o grounds. 2
(1)

That in misdemeanor cases the maximum period of imprisonment

is usually so short that a probationary period of the same length
·•auld be useless and therefore judges would give jail sentences where
Jrobation '.-Jould othen.;ise be proper; and

See Sponsored
Jucgeby the
Croft'
3 Law
:-!emorandum
Ooinion
R.by the
74-78
S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
provided
Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
_Q_

(2)

That the problem in (l) above is accentuated where a

defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense after having been
charged with a greater offense.
Appellant believes it is extremely difficult for any one
judge to determine just how long a period of probation is necessary
to rehabilitate an offender.

While it would seem likely that a

fir~

offender would need a lesser period than a repeat offender, such is
not necessarily the case.
be able to have the
case-by-case basis.

Appellant agrees that a judge must

f:ex~:~:~ty

to deal with offenders on a

To this extent, §77-35-17 grants the court

the power to increase or decrease the probation period or to revoke
or modify any condition of probation.

Appellant sees this

flexibility as essential to the rehabilitative process, however, sue
power must be guided by a maximum limit to the period of probation.
Several states have recognized this and enacted statutes specificall
limiting the probation period, as discussed earlier.

In some states

where no limits are prescribed, courts have placed the statutory
maximum for incarceration as the limit for probation.

(See e. g.

State v. Lard, supra and State v. Sandoval, supra. )
Although it may well be true that some defendants cannot be
rehabilitated within statutory maximums for misdemeanors, isn't it
also true that the statutory maximum for imprisonment may not
be long enough to alter a defendant's course of criminal conduct?
All lawyers dealing with criminal cases are familiar with offenders
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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who have been imprisoned for statutory maximums in misdemeanor cases
and then convicted again for other offenses.

We may very well

argue that a six month jail sentence is not enough time to
rehabilitate or punish, but the important thing is that our
legislature has fixed a maximum period of incarceration for both
misdemeanor and felony offenses.
periods is parallel.

The principle involved in probation

Although we may not be sure a statutory

maximum sentence for imprisonment is a long enough limit for probation,
our legislature has classified crimes by placing limits on penalties
for those

cri~es.

Just as some crimes are more serious than others,

requiring longer maximum sentences, so too this distinction exists
in the concept of rehabilitating persons convicted of those crimes.
Some crimes require greater periods of rehabilitation because of their
seriousness than others.

In his memorandum decision, Judge Croft states

that under Utah law some jail sentences cannot exceed ninety days,
as for a Class C misdemeanor, "and a probationary period of
such short duration hardly serves any useful purpose."

However, more

insight into Judge Croft's conclusion may be gained by looking at some
crimes which are Class C misdemeanors.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106 (as amended 1973),
harassment is a Class C misdemeanor; under §76-6-106, Criminal
~ischief

where damage is below $250 is a Class C misdemeanor; under

76-6-206, Criminal Trespass of a non-dwelling is a Class C misdemeanor.
The point is simply that our legislature has determined that criminal
conduct in those cases is less serious than in others, therefore, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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penalties are less serious.

Although it may be argued that

three months probation may not be long enough to rehabilitate a persor.
convicted of Harassment, it may also be argued that three months
in jail may not be long enough to rehabilitate or punish such person
either.

After three months in jail, the offender may repeat his

offense or commit another offense proving that three months was
not long enough.

Could it then be argued that the sentencing judge

should have been able to

sen~ence

the offender for a longer period,

despite the legislative recognition of the low level of seriousness
of such offense?

Appellant thinks not and asks this court to conclude

that any court s sentencing power is guided by the legislature and no:
1

open to interpretation by each individual judge, whether that
judge is considering imprisonment or probation.
As to the second reason for Judge Croft s denial of appellant'
1

motion to dismiss, appellant feels that the preceding discussion
adequately represents his view on the issue.

Appellant would

additionally point out to the Court that our notions of Due Process
of Law require that a man be punished only for the crime he has been
convicted of.

Judge Croft seems to imply that a defendant should be

ptmished for having been orginally charged with an offense greater
he is eventually convicted of.

The implication is that a judge

may be hesitant to give probation in plea-bargained cases if he is
limited by the probation period in the lesser offense rather than
being able to give the defendant the probation period which would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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t~'

have been given if he had plead to the greater offense.

Since a

defendant is presumed innocent at all stages of a criminal
proceeding prior to conviction, why should he be punished for an
offense he was never convicted of?

As this Court well knows,

numerous considerations are involved in plea-bargaining, not the least
of which is that prosecutors sometimes overcharge cases hoping to
bring pressure upon a defendant to plead guilty to the crime he is
really guilty of, and which carries a lesser penalty than the
original charge.

In such cases, the legislative determination as to

the seriousness of the lesser offense should control a judge's
power to sentence,both for imprisonment and probation.
In response to the point that judges may not accept plea
bargains if the probationary period is limited to the period
of imprisonment of the lesser offense, appellant would argue that
if the court has that much concern then perhaps it should not accept
the plea to a lesser offense anyway.
Although appellant understands Judge Croft's concern, appellant
believes that the interpretation he suggests would best serve the
legislative intent and the concept of Due Process of Law as discussed
~Point

II of this brief.

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE INTENDED THAT THERE BE PROPORTIONATE
LIMITS ON PROBATION POWERS OF UTAH COURTS.
As has been seen, Utah Code Annotated §77-35-17 (1953) gives
the courts power to place a defendant on probation "for such period:
time as the court shall determine"; but it is the position of appelL
that this phraseo:..:>gy ·was not intended to give courts unlimited juri:
diction over a proba':J..cner' s liberty.

Appellant alleges that whatevE

period of time is involved must be consistent with other law on the
subject.

He, therefore, urges this Court to adopt the more reasonaL

interpretation that the legislature intended to allow for a probatic:
period consistent with the Utah Criminal Code, and an individual's
right to Due Process of Law under the Constitutions of the United
States and the State of Utah, by limiting a Court's jurisdiction fo:
probationary periods.
Jurisdiction is a common-law creature expressly embodied
in both the United States and Utah Constitutions.

The authority

of District Courts in Utah flows from the jurisdiction granted the~
by the State Constitution3 and legislative enactrnen:s in harmony
with such grants of power.

See Rocky Ford Canal Co. v. Cox, Judge.

92 U. 148, 59 P. 2d 935 (1936).
It is clear that the legislature has the power to prescribe
and define the forum in which a civil or criminal matter must be
commenced and therefore to set limitations on the jurisdiction of
3.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Art. VIII Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah
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District Courts. 4

In fact, the legislative power to prescribe

penalties for crimes necessarily requires a maximum period of
incarceration for such crimes whether the sentences are determinate
. d eterm~nate.
.
5
or ~n

Appellant contends that it is a matter of Constitutional
doctrine that the legislature provide jurisdictional limits for
probation or parole just as it provides limits for incarceration.
In fact, the Utah legislature, in adopting a complete revision of
Utah's criminal code which was effective July 1, 1973, adopted a statute
which clearly establishes the intent of the legislature to
jurisdictionally limit periods of probation for criminal offenses.
Ctah Code Annotated §76-3-201 (as amended 1973) provides:
ter, a court
"(1) Within the limits rescribed
may sentence a person a ju ge guk ty o an o ense to any
one of the following sentences or combination of such sentences:
(a) to pay a fine; or
(b) to removal from and/or disqualification of public or
private office; or
(c) to ?rob~tion; or
(d) to ~mprksonment; or
(e) to death."
(emphasis added)
It would appear that it is the declared policy of the
cegis1ature to prescribe jurisdictional limits for probation; and
further that such limitations appear within that chapter (Chapter 3,
Punishments).

Utah Code Annot3ted §77-35-17 (1953) appears as

~

State •.·. Johnson, 100 U. 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941)

S.

Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203-206, (as amended 1973).
-15-
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part of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is found in
an entirely different Title (let alone chapter) than §76-3-201,
which is part of Utah's Criminal Code.

Since that Section

was enacted in 1953, it would seem that the 1973 provision
(76-3-201) was intended by the legislature to be controlling on the
question of jurisdictional limitations on a court's power to
determine time periods for probation in criminal cases.

This

argument is even more persuasive when considered from the point of
view that since §77-35-17 allows probation "for such period of time
as the court shall determine" the legislature, due to the absence
of specific jurisdictional standards, intended that that period
of time be consistent with the limitations imposed by other relevant
statutes and that those limitations are the maximum period of time
to which a defendant may be sentenced to incarceration (now under
Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code) .
It seems logical to conclude that the legislature intended
(through 76-3-201) to place limitations on the period of time for
which a defendant may be placed on probation, but since Chapter 3 does
not specifically delineate such limitations, the legislature must
have intended the maximum terms of imprisonment to also be maximum
terms for probation.
Such reasoning would be consistent with the overall policy
of Utah's Criminal Code expressed in Utah Code Annotated §76-l-104
(as amended 1975):
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance
with these general purposes: . . . (3) Prescribe penalties
.
which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and •,.rh:c
permit recognition or difference in rehabilitation possibilit:e
Sponsored
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It would seem clear that if the legislature determined for
example, that theft of property under $100.00 was only serious
enough to warrant imprisonment for six months, that any period of
probation provided in lieu of imprisonment should not be any longer.
If a serious felony is committed, it seems logical that the period
of probation should be proportionate to the period of incarceration.
If the legislature determines that aggravated assault requires
a 0-5 year sentence of imprisonment, the seriousness of that offense
also requires a longer period of probation than in a less serious
theft case, if probation is granted in lieu of imprisonment.
It seems to be a fact of the criminal justice system that
probation, so often construed as a "privilege," is in fact to some
extent, a penalty.

The limitations on one's privacy and freedom

of movement and association are such that one is clearly "penalized"
for one's criminal conduct even through not imprisoned, and this
is certainly the way it should be.

This view was supported by

Justice Crockett in Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 321, 502 P.2d 115
(1972).

"Even though he has been placed on parole, he is deemed
to be actually serving the sentence imposed, and is in a
sense in the extended custody of prison authorities."
502 P.2d at 117.
Although a petitioner's parole status was the subject of that
appeal, the principle certainly can be related to the status of probation
as well.

A defendant on probation is, in a sense, in the extended

rustody of the Court.

He is required as a condition of probation
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to follow the instructions of his probation officer.

Among other

things those instructions uniformly include:
(a) Maintaining employment;
(b) Notifying probation officer of change of address;
(c) Getting permission of probation officer to leave the
state or to marry;
(d) Not associating with known felons.
No one, least of all appellant, can argue that such restrictio:
are too severe or unnecessary where one has been convicted of a crime
and is on probation in lieu of total loss of his liberty.

Appellant

simply points out these restrictions to remind the court that
probation is, in and of itself, to some extent a penalty.

Is it

not logical to conclude then, that the stated legislative purpose
of prescribing penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness
of offenses requires the interpretation that maximum terms of
imprisonment were also intended to be maximum terms for probation?
That a defendant has certain rights, as well as responsibilit:
while on probation, is a concept that has been established through a
long line of Utah Supreme Court cases.

The landmark case on the

issue was State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 25 P. 1044 (1927).

In a

scholarly and frequently quoted opinion, Justice Elias Hansen writing
for the majority said:
"The purpose of the law permitting the suspension of sentence
is clearly reformatory. If those who are to be reformed
cannot implicitly rely upon promises or orders contained
in the suspension of sentence, then we may well expect
the law to fail in its purpose. Reformation can certainly
best be accomplished by fair, consistent, and straighforward
treatment of the person sought to be reformed."
259 P. at 1046.
This Court then, announced as early as 1927 that the
legal concept of probation is not to be treated lightly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

in this State.

In fact, this opinion, decided 45 years prior to the

heralded United States Supreme Court case of Morrisey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972) established
the principle that a probationer was entitled to Due Process of Law
before his probation could be revoked, and that such Due Process
required:
. . a hearing upon the question of whether or not he has
complied with the conditions imposed; that such hearing must
be according to some well recognized and established
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant is entitled
to have filed either an affidavit, motion or other written
pleading setting forth the facts relied upon for a
revocation of the suspension of sentence; that the defendant
should be given an opportunity to answer or plead to the
charge made; that a hearing should be had upon the issues
stated; and that the defendant as well as the state be
given the right of cross-examination."
259 P. at 1047.
Justice Hansen made crystal clear this Court's attitude
toward those requirements when he concluded the point by declaring:
"If we are correct in our conclusion that the defendant
has a vested right to his personal liberty during
good behavior when so ordered without reservation in the
original sentence, any proceeding failing in these
essentials is error."
259 P. at 1047.
Lawyers and judges alike have agreed that the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Morrissey in 1972 was a step forward in
the administration of the American concept of Constitutional justice.
But isn't it interesting that the Utah Supreme Court recognized
same rights for probationers at a time when most states allowed
probation revocations at the whim and caprice of the sentencing
judge?
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the

This high regard for the purpose and fairness of the very
concept of probation has been reiterated in numerous Utah Supreme
Court decisions through the years.

See Thompson v. Harris, Warden,

106 Utah 32, 144 P.2d 761 at 767 (1943); Williams v. Harris, Warden,
106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 at 642 (1944); State v. Fedder, 1 Utah
2d 117, 262 P.2d 753 (1953); Baine v. Beckstead, 10 Ut. 2d 4, 347

P.~

554 (1959); State v. Eichler, 25 Ut. 2d 421, 483 P.2d 887 (1971);
Brimhall v. Turner, 28 Ut. 2d 321, 502 P.2d 116 (1972).
In the Brimhall case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court expanded
the due process requirements of Zolantakis in reviewing a parole
revocation attacked by virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding.
Writing for the majority, Justice Crockett said:
" . . . (W)e acknowledge the mere fact that there has been
an accusation of crime should give rise to no presumption
adverse to plaintiff."
502 P. 2d at 117.
Although Zolantakis and the cases following implied that a
probationer should be afforded the presumption of innocence when
accused of a new violation of law, Justice Crockett's pronouncement
was the first express declaration of this important principle.

Thus.

/through a long series of cases, this Court has recognized that probac.
have rights as well as responsibilities.

It seems logical to con clue

that the state legislature intended to follow these forward-looking
_/due process consepts by limiting the period of probation to the
maximum period of imprisonment provided for in the statute

describin~

a crime, whether that statute is found in Utah's Criminal Code, it's
Motor Vehicle Act, or its Controlled Substances Act.
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CONCLUSION
It seems to be such a small and logical step for this
Court to conclude that where there is no specific legislative
pronouncement as to the length of a probationary period, that justice
and fairness dictate that the maximum period of imprisonment be controllin:

as the maximum period of probation also.

By drawing such a conclusion,

this Court would be following the wise pronouncement of policy in
probation cases as expounded by Justice Hansen almost 50 years ago
•.when he said:
"Reformation can certainly best be accomplished by fair,
consistent and straightforward treatment of the person
sought to be reformed."
259 P. at 1046.
Would it not be fair to allow a person convicted of a crime
to know that the maximum limit of his period of probation will be no
longer than that of anyone else convicted of the same crime?

Wouldn't

it remove the bitterness and counterproductive attitude that sometimes
develops when a person can see that he is not being treated consistently
·~th

others in his same circumstance?

Would it not be straightforward

for the law to adequately inform a defendant that he will be required
to undergo the severe limitations probation often requires for a
set and established period of time; a period whosemaximum is dictated
8y the legislature and not the sometimes inexact evaluation of the

iudge who sentences him?
Res?ectfully submitted,
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APPENDIX "A"

In the District Court of the Third Judicial District,
in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
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